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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court had jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, since it is a consolidated
appeal from the district court of a matter over which the Court of
Appeals did not have original jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals

now has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j)
as a case transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court.
Appellate jurisdiction was originally invoked by reason
of Notices of Appeal filed in compliance with Rule 3.(a) of the Rules
of Appellate Procedure, namely, the Notice of Appeal dated September
16, 1991, which was deemed to have given notice of an appeal of
the Default Judgment entered nunc pro tunc as of August 22, 1991,
and by reason of the Notice of Appeal dated Monday February 24,
1992, which gave notice of an appeal of the Order dated January
23, 1992 denying defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment,
which Motion was filed on November 18, 1991 and was likewise
deemed to have referred to the same Default Judgment.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appellant asserts that the standard of review under
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991) is whether the
trial court abused its discretion, and the pertinent issues are
as follows:
1.

Did the trial court err by sanctioning the failure

to respond to discovery with a Default Judgment entered in the
principal sum of $12,559.70 (giving no allowance for the $11,050
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plus interest claimed as a credit) on the basis of an order entered
when defendant was unrepresented by counsel, where after the
appearance of new counsel and the breakdown of settlement negotiations,
appropriate response was made to the discovery within a month
despite defendant's principal officer being in Chile?
2.

Did the trial court err by refusing to set aside in

the interest of justice a Default Judgment which resulted from a
sanction for the failure to respond to discovery and which Default
Judgment was entered in the principal sum of $12,559.70 (giving no
allowance for the $11,050 plus interest claimed as a credit) on
the basis of an order entered when defendant was unrepresented by
counsel, where after the appearance of new counsel and the breakdown
of settlement negotiations, appropriate response was made to the
discovery within a month despite defendant's principal officer
being in Chile?
RULE TO BE INTERPRETED
Rule 60(b) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
•• • •

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was brought by plaintiff to collect a debt
on an account.

The action was defended on the basis of payments,

that credits omitted in the accounting offset at least the amount
plaintiff claimed.

Following the filing of a motion to compel a
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response to discovery, the trial court ordered interrogatories
answered within 10 days at a time when defendant was without
counsel.

New counsel entered into settlement negotiation before

answering the interrogatories. Once the settlement negotiations
failed, the interrogatories were answered within 30 days despite
the absence of a key principal of defendant.

Nevertheless, the

sanction of a Default Judgment was entered and the trial court
refused to set that Judgment aside.
The facts in more detail are as follows, with citations
to the record on appeal (ROA):
1.

This was a collection action based on defendant's

alleged failure to timely pay an account with plaintiff.
2.

ROA at 2.

Summons in this action was served on defendant

on December 6, 1990, along with a copy of the Complaint dated
November 2, 1990. ROA at 7.
3. Following receipt of defendants1 Answer, and on
January 3, 1991, plaintiff served defendant with Plaintiff's First
Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents,
bearing that same date of January 3, 1991. ROA at 10, 12.
4.

On April 3, 1991, plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel

defendant to respond to that discovery, which Motion was followed
by a Request to Submit for Decision dated April 19, 1991. ROA at
13, 21.
5.

A couple of days later, on April 22, 1991, defendant's

attorney, Terry C. Turner, mailed his Withdrawal of Counsel, which
was followed by the plaintiff's Notice to Appear or Appoint New
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Counsel dated May 1, 1991. ROA at 28, 30.
6.

While defendant was without counsel, a Minute Entry

was made dated April 23, 1991 granting "defendant's" Motion to
Compel, including reasonable attorney's fees of $127.50, noting
the lack of opposition.

The Minute Entry also required a response

within ten days to avoid "dismissal." ROA at 23.
7.

Plaintiff's counsel then wrote the trial court to

explain that there had been a mix-up in the designations, and that
it was plaintiff fs Motion, warranting the striking of defendant's
Answer, and submitted a corresponding Order.
8.

ROA at 26.

The Order thus submitted, which required a response

to discovery within ten days, was executed on May 1, 1991, and
followed up with a corresponding Amended Minute Entry dated May 9,
1991, all while defendant was without counsel.
9.

ROA at 24, 32.

On or about May 10, 1991, Delwin T. Pond was retained

to represent the defendant, and the defendant's principal advised
its new attorney of the need to answer some interrogatories and
gave no indication of a desire postpone or avoid that task.

A

copy of his affidavits attesting to these facts and others referred
to hereinbelow is attached hereto.
10.

ROA at 40, 81.

However, Mr. Pond felt there was a good possibility

to settle the entire matter and on that date he spoke with plaintiff's
counsel concerning the possibility of settlement, which conversation
was followed by an exchange of documentation, including a document
dated May 26, 1987 showing the items returned by defendant to
plaintiff for a total credit of $11,050.

ROA at 82, 84.

8
11.

Defendant halted these negotiations by means of

a letter to Mr. Pond dated June 3, 1991, a copy of which is attached
hereto, indicating that no credit would be given for those items
and setting a deadline of June 14, 1991 for the response to discovery*
ROA at 38.
12.

Mr. Pond immediately forwarded a copy of this letter

to defendant and followed that up with a telephone call on June
10, 1991. However, the officer with the information needed to
respond to discovery had gone to Chile for a month.
13.

ROA at 41.

After contacting other principals of the defendant

and trying on numerous occasions to contact defendant's former
attorney, Mr. Pond was finally able to get through to the officer
in Chile so he could draft an accurate response, which response
was signed by an officer of defendant's available locally, and
served July 3, 1991. ROA at 41, 82-83, 43. A copy of these
Answers to Interogatories is attached hereto.
14.

ROA at 75.

Meanwhile, plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of

Default dated June 27, 1991. On July 3, 1991 defendant responded
by serving an Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Entry of Judgment setting forth the pertinent foregoing facts.
Plaintiff then filed a Supplemental Affidavit of Leslie Van Frank
dated July 10, 1991 and a Request to Submit for Decision dated
July 16, 1991. ROA at 33, 40, 44, 47.
15.

By means of a Minute Entry dated July 31, 1991,

the trial court granted plaintiff's said Motion for Entry of Default.
It then executed the Order and Default Judgment, the latter granting
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judgment for the $12,559.70 principal sought (giving no allowance
for the $11,050 plus interest in credit), which together with
interest, costs, and attorneys1 fees brought the total judgment to
$18,103.95.

On March 16, 1992, this Order and Default Judgment

were entered nunc pro tunc as of August 22, 1991. ROA at 49, 50,
135, 139(?).
16.

A Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was the

only post judgment motion, and was filed on November 18, 1991. It
was supported by a Memorandum and an Affidavit of Delwin T. Pond
and copies of the responses to discoverye
17.

ROA at 62, 64, 81, 75.

A Request for Hearing on the matter was denied

in a Minute Entry dated December 19, 1991, and the Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment was denied in an Order dated and entered
January 23, 1992. ROA at 100, 105.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

There was no willfulness in the failure to respond

to discovery which would justify the harsh sanction of a default
judgment.
The cases require a showing of willfulness, bad faith,
or fault to justify sanctioning a failure to respond in a timely
manner to discovery, and especially to justify the harsh sanction
of the entry of a default judgment.
was no need to "deter misconduct."
misconduct."

In the instant matter, there
There was no "aggravated

There was no "willful and deliberate disobedience of

discovery orders." There was no "bad faith conduct."

There was

nothing that would rise to the level of "intentional failure," or
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anything close to demonstrating willfulness.
2.

The harsh sanction of a default judgment should have

been set aside in the interest of justice.
Once the default judgment in the sum of $18,103.95 plus
interest and costs had been entered, it should have been set aside
in the interest of justice in view of the neglect being excusable
and since the defendant's credits may well have completely offset
the principal amounts claimed by the plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
1.

THERE WAS NO WILLFULNESS IN THE FAILURE TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY

WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE HARSH SANCTION OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
In 1984, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of
the imposition of sanctions when a party fails to respond to an
order compelling discovery in a case quoted several times since by
the Utah Court of Appeals, namely, First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984).
In that case, the Supreme Court emphasized that for such
sanctions to be imposed, there needed to be an element of willfulness
in the failure to respond to the order compelling discovery:
The general rule is that a party in a civil
case who refuses to respond to an order compelling
discovery is subject to sanctions pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). [Citation.] The
sanctions are intended to deter misconduct in
connection with discovery, [citation], and
require a showing of "willfulness, bad faith,
or fault" on the part of the non-complying
party. Id. [Emphasis added.]
Obviously, more than the mere failure to respond is
required for the sanctions to be imposed.

Whereas a simple failure
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to respond to summons justifies entry of a default and default
judgment, a simple failure to respond to discovery does not*
The party seeking a sanction for the failure to respond bears the
burden of demonstrating not only a failure to respond to discovery,
but that the failure was willful, or there was bad faith, or some
other additional fault.
In First Federal, a civil case, the issue was whether
the defendant wrongfully retrieved a check after being paid for
it*

When she was asked to admit taking the check, she affirmatively

refused to answer, and maintained this refusal despite an order
compelling a response.

Thus willfulness was clearly present.

The opinion in Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768
P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989) included a quotation of some of the same
language of the Supreme Court quoted above.

That language was

used by the Court of Appeals to show that it is harsh to sanction
a party for failure to comply with discovery:
Imposing sanctions for a party's refusal to
respond to a court order compelling discovery
is a harsh sanction and therefore, requires "a
showing of 'willfulness, bad faith, or fault'
on the part of the non-complying party."
Id. at 961. [Emphasis added.]
This Arnica court went on to say that although wrongful
intent need not be shown, willfulness does involve at least an
intentional failure:
"Willful failure" has been defined as "'any
intentional failure as distinguised from
involuntary noncompliance. ...'" Id.
The sanction in the Arnica case was upheld.

The non-complying

party failed to demonstrate that there was any inability to comply.
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Although no findings were made of "willfulness, bad
faith, or fault," the record clearly showed the existence thereof,
allowing the the imposition of sanctions to be upheld.
The record in this case clearly demonstrates a
pattern of aggravated misconduct in the form
of willful and deliberate disobedience of
discovery orders, fabricated testimony, and
attempted witness tampering* In light of this
overwhelming evidence of willful and bad faith
conduct, the trial court's failure to make a
specific finding of willfulness was not reversible
error, ^d. at 962.
In the case of Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790
P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1990), other factors seemed to have reduced
the burden of showing "willfulness, bad faith, or fault."

Although

answers to the interrogatories were tendered at the hearing on the
motion for sanctions, default judgment was entered against the
plaintiff based on the failure to respond in a timely manner.
The Schoney case had been pending for five years at the
trial court level. There had been five amended complaints. The
plaintiff had narrowly escaped summary judgment.

The trial court

obviously was growing impatient and wanted to move the case along.
The court had imposed a discovery cut-off date, and the trial date
was set for only a few weeks thereafter.

The failure to respond

hurt the defendant's position, not only with respect to the discovery
propounded, but also with respect to any follow-up discovery that
might be deemed appropriate in light of the responses.
Thus in the Schoney case, the failure to respond in a
timely manner became much more analogous to a failure to respond
in a timely manner to a summons. Therefore, the appellate court
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concluded there had not been an abuse of discretion "given the
posture of this casec"

Id. at 586.

In the case of Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah
App* 1991), the issue was whether the trial court abused its
discretion when it set aside the default judgment it previously
entered as a discovery sanction.

An order requiring the payment

of additional costs and attorney fees had been substituted as the
discovery sanction.
The Court of Appeals first found that the conduct of the
sanctioned party, including obnoxious litigation strategies, did
indeed rise to the level which would justify discovery sanctions.
Therefore, the appellate court probably would not have reversed
the trial court had it left the default judgment in place, and
would have reversed had there been no sanction imposed.
Specifically, the defendants had avoided service of
process and had to be served by publication.

They then refused to

cooperate with discovery over a period of two years.

Default

judgment had been entered once for this failure to respond to
discovery and was then set aside.
Even after this, defendants continued to be elusive and
uncooperative, resulting in a motion to compel, which was granted.
One appearance at a deposition resulted, but when no documents
were produced, and other depositions scheduled, the defendants did
not appear.

Hence the second default judgment was entered.

In upholding the trial court's decision to substitute
another sanction for that this second default judgment, the Darrington
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opinion stated that "default judgment is an unusually harsh sanction
that should be meted out with caution," citing Arnica, Id, at
546.

[Emphasis added.]
The Darrington court then cited Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d

92 (Utah 1986) for the proposition that the trial court was within
its discretion in setting aside the default judgment.
In the instant matter, there was no "willfulness, bad
faith, or fault" of the type necessary to impose discovery sanctions.
The only fault that might exist would be negligencef that is, excusable
neglect.

And that would not be the kind of fault meant.

Under

the principles of ejusdem generis, the fault needs to be of a type
analogous to willfulness or bad faith.

Nephi City v. Hansen, 779

P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1989).
In the instant matter, there was no need to "deter
misconduct."

There was no "aggravated misconduct."

There was no

"willful and deliberate disobedience of discovery orders." There
was no "bad faith conduct."

There was nothing that would rise to

the level of "intentional failure," or anything close to demonstrating
willfulness.
Rather, as indicated in the affidavits of Delwin T. Pond
attached hereto, the defendant's principal advised its new attorney
of the need to answer some interrogatories and gave no indication
of a desire postpone or avoid that task.

ROA at 81. After a period

of negotiation, there were the strenuous efforts described in the
affidavits of Delwin T. Pond to comply with the discovery requests
despite that principal being in Chile at the time.

ROA 41, 82-83.
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It is true that these efforts did not reach fruition until 19 days
after the 11-day deadline set by opposing counsel.

But there was

certainly no willfulness nor bad faith in this simple failure to
comply in a timely manner.
Likewise there were no factors which would justify a
lower standard of willfulness.

This matter had not been pending

two to five years. There had been no discovery cut-off date or trial
date set.
Even had there been such willfulness as to justify
imposing sanctions for failure to comply with discovery, it would
certainly not rise to the level of justifying the entry of a
default judgment, "an unusually harsh sanction that should be
meted out with caution."
2.

Darrington, supra, at 546.

THE HARSH SANCTION OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET

ASIDE IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.
Rule 60(b) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
... [Emphasis added.]
In the first part of the opinion found in Katz v. Pierce,
732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court recited some basic
principles to be applied in ruling on a motion under Rule 60(b):
The court should be generally indulgent toward
setting a judgment aside where there is reasonable
justification or excuse for the defendant's
failure to answer and when timely application
is made. Where there is doubt about whether a
default should be set aside, that doubt should
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be resolved in favor of doing so.
That case also suggested the trial court consider the
preference to allow the presentation of all claims and defenses,
the unfairness of a party's conduct, the resulting hardships, as
well as the fact that the trial court should liberally grant
relief from a default.
In the instant matter, the hardship to the defendant of
leaving the judgment in place was extreme, and it was in the interest
of justice to allow the presentation of all defenses.
In response to the plaintiff's Request for Production of
Documents, defendant produced a copy of the letter to plaintiff
dated May 26, 1987 itemizing the returns resulting in a credit of
$11,050 on that date, a copy of which letter is attached to the
Affidavit of Delwin T. Pond dated November 15, 1991 attached
hereto.

ROA at 84. This credit was wrongfully refused by defendant.

Thus although the plaintiff sued for the principal amount of
$12,559.70, that amount was only $1,509.70 more than the omitted
credit.
Discovery on the part of the defendant had not been
pursued.

It might well have shown that the principal amount owing

was not $12,55 9.70 before allowing any credit for the returns, but
$10,873.37, as indicated in the letter to defendant from plaintiff's
attorney dated November 28, 1989, a copy of which is attached
hereto.

ROA at 80. In the latter case, the credit due defendant

in 1987 would exceed the amount due the plaintiff in 1989.
The furtherance of justice required that the defendant be
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allowed to present its defenses rather than being subjected to a
default judgment in the sum of $18,103.95 plus interest and costs.
CONCLUSION
There was not the requisite showing of willfulness, bad
faith, or fault to justify the harsh sanction of the entry of a
default judgment for the failure to respond in a timely manner to
discovery requests. Once the default judgment in the sum of
$18,103.95 plus interest and costs had been entered, it should have
been set aside in the interest of justice in view of the neglect
being excusable and since a trial on the merits may well have
shown that the defendant's credits had completely offset the
principal amounts claimed by the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff's
Complaint should have been dismissed, no cause of action.
Therefore, this Court should vacate the Order and Default
Judgment entered below and remand for a continuation of the litigation,
DATED this

//~"~ day of

tf<^

1992.

LYNN P. HEWARD & DELWIN T. POND
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant

LYNN P. HEWARD
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four copies of this Brief were
mailed to Leslie Van Frank, P.O. Box 11008, Salt Lake City, UT
84147 on this

// ^ day of

attached thereon.

f/CO^^

, 1992, with postage
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Esq e

923 East 5375 South
Suite E
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Re:

GRO Enterprises dba Chicago Barter vs National Insurance
Marketing Services, Inc.

Dear Mr. Pond:
I am in receipt of your note of May 29, 1991 with respect to
National Insurance Marketing Services, Inc/s alleged credit for
defective or outdated merchandise in the amount of $11,050.00.
After review of my file, this is the same claim that your client
has been making throughout the pendency of this lawsuit. My client
has no record of ever receiving any return items, and cannot credit
your client for the claimed returns.
The first my client had ever
heard of any claimed credit was in late November, 1989 in response
to a demand letter that this office had sent.
My client is
unwilling at this time to allow your client any credit for the
claimed returns, and has instructed us to proceed with the lawsuit.
Accordingly, and as you know, the court recently ordered that
your client respond to the outstanding discovery by May 11, 1991,
or its answer would be stricken and default entered. Because Mr.
Turner withdrew as counsel, I sent notice to your client of an
additional 20 days within which to appear or appoint new counsel.
That time expired on May 21, 1991. Your client has had more than
ample opportunity to answer the discovery, and on June 14, 1991, I
will approach the court for an order entering their default if
answers to the discovery are not delivered to this office before
then.

Del win T. Pond, Esq.
June 4, 1991
Page 2

If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter
further, please do not hesitate to callc
Very truly yours,

LVF: cp
cc:

Chicago Barter Corporation
Dunn and Bradstreet

Delwin T. Pond #2623
Attorney for Defendant
923 East 5375 South
Executive Park Drive
Suite E
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Tel.d (801) 264-8040
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH
GRO ENTERPRISES, I N C , dba
CHICAGO BARTER CORP.,
Plaintiff,

]
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY
>
OF JUDGMENT
1 Civil No. 90-0906404-CN

VS.

) Judge Je Dennis Frederick
NATIONAL INSURANCE MARKETING
SERVICES, INC, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant*
COMES NOW, the defendant, by and through his attorney,
Delwin T. Pond, and hereby submitts the following Affidavit in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment*
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
) ss.
)

Delwin T, Pond, first being duly sworn on oath deposes
and says as follows:
1.

I have been retained by the defendant, National

Insurance Marketing Services, Inc., a Utah Corporation, to represent
them in the above-entitled matter.

That I was retained by said

defendant on or about the 10th day of May, 1991.
2.

That on or about the 10th day of May, 1991, I spoke

to Leslie Van Frank, counsel for the plaintiff, to inquire about
the possibility of settling the action in total, which my client
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indicated a willingness to do, provided they were given credit for
goods that they claim were returned to the plaintiff*
3.

On May 29, 1991, I sent to plaintiff's counsel a

copy of the Memorandum generated by the plaintiff relating to
defendant's claim that goods for credit were returned to the plaintifi
4.

On June 3, 1991, I received a reply from plaintiff's

counsel in writing, a copy of which is attached hereto marked
"Exhibit h'\

On or about June 5, 1991, I forwarded a copy of

plaintiff's counsel's letter to the defendant for his information
and response.

I received no response from my client, and so on or

about June 10, 1991, I called my client, inasmuch as I had not
heard from him relatiave to plaintiff's letter that was forwarded
to him from the plaintiff, as well as to inform him that he would
need to assist in the preparation of responses to the plaintiff's
interrogatories.

At the time of this call, I was advised and

informed that Mr. Bob Weeks, defendant's chief executive officer,
had left the U. S. A. for the country of Chili on or about June 9,
1991, and was not expected to return for a month.
5.

I was finally able to contact Mr. Weeks in Chili to

obtain information from him with regard to the answers to the
Interrogatories, which have now been answered and submitted to the
plaintiff's counsel.
FURTHER, AFFIANT SA¥ETH NOT.
DATED, this the ^ / ^ d a y of July, 1991.

DELWIN T. POND, Attorney for Defendant
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Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on this the
<?
day
of July, 1991.

Notary Public
,
LYNN HEWARO
I
3479 Muriel Way
I
West Vatey City. Utah 04119.
My CommiMion Expires *
***o/Utah

j
NOTARY PUBLIC

I

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a correct copy of the
within and foregoing Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Entry of Judgment to plaintiff's counsel Leslie Van Frank at
525 East First Sotfth, Fifth Floor Salt Lake City, Utah 84147j:5L008
on this the
"^)L^ day of July, 1991.
~ N
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DelwiLy. Pond #2623
Attorney for Defendant
923 East 5375 South
Suite E
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Tel (801) 264-8040
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH
GRO ENTERPRISES, INC., dba
CHICAGO BARTER CORP.,
ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES
Plaintiff ,
Civil No. 90-0906404-CN
vs.
Judge J. Dennis Frederick
NATIONAL INSURANCE MARKETING
SERVICES, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant.
Defendant, National Insurances Services, Inc., pursuant
to Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure hereby answers the Interrogatories
under oath, as propounded by the plaintiff to the defendant, under
date of January 3, 1991.
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

Identify each paragraph of plaintifffs

complaint which you specifically deny.
ANSWER:

Defendant specifically denies paragraphs 6 and

7.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Identify each paragraph of plaintiff's

complaint which you deny because you allegedly lack knowledge thereof.
ANSWER:

Defendant alleges that he is without knowledge

or information sufficient to form a belief as to the complete
truth or falsity of the averments contained in paragraph 3,
and 8.

4,5
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INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

State the factual basis for your

specific denial of the paragraphs identified in Interrogatory
No. 1 herein*
ANSWER:

The factual basis for defendant's denial of

paragraph'6 is that defendant returned, for credit, to the plaintiff
goods and merchandise equal in value to $11,050.00, which amount
plaintiff has not, but should have credited to the account of the
defendant.

Paragraph 7, defendant admits that he has failed and

refused and does continue to fail and refuse to pay the amount
plaintiff claims to be due in the sum of $12,559.70, but denies
that such amount is due or owing, because appropriate credits in
the sum of $11,050.00 has not been made to defendant's account.
INTRERROGATORY NO. 4:

State the factual basis for your

affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction.
ANSWER:

The factual basis of affirmative defense of

accord and satisfaction is that the defendant returned goods and
merchandise to the plaintiff equal in the amount of $11,050.00,
which should have been credited to the account of the defendant,
wherefore, there should have been an accord and satisfaction
entered into in the amount of $11,050.00.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

State the factual basis for your

affirmative defense of estoppel.
ANSWER:

Due to the return of defective or outdated

merchandise to the plaintiff, the plaintiff should be estopped
from pursuing this action against the defendant.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

State the factual basis for your

3
affirmative defense of failure of consideration,
ANSWER:

The factual basis for the affirmative defense

of failure consideration is that goods and services that were to
be exchanged have been returned to the defendant in the sum of
$11,050.00.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

State the factual basis for your

affirmative defense of statute of limitations,
ANSWER:

Defendant believes that the account was opened

more than four years prior to the date that the plaintiff commenced
action against the defendant, and if so, to the extent that such
agreements were verbal, and not in writing, the statute of limitations
would have expired, thus barring the plaintiff's claim against the
defendant to the extent of liability created by oral agreements.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

State the factual basis for your

affirmative defense of statue of frauds.
ANSWER:

The factual basis for defendant's affirmative

defense of the statute of frauds is that defendant believes that
part of the agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the
defendant was oral and not in writing, and to the extent that it
was an oral agreement and not in writing, the statute of frauds
will have barred defendant from action against the defendant on
such oral agreements.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

State the factual basis for your

affirmative defense of laches.
ANSWER:

The case is old, much time has expired, records

have been lost or destroyed before the action was brought.

For

4
this reason, it is inequitable to bring the action at this late
and deferred date.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

State the factual basis to your

claim that you are entitled to attorney's fees.
ANSWER:

The return of the goods by the defendant to the

plaintiff, constitutes a substantial satisfaction of the debt and
obligation that the defendant owed to the plaintiff, and that for
plaintiff to now bring the action demanding more than the plaintiff
is in fact entitled to, constitutes good cause for the defendant
to ascert a claim for attorney's fees.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11:

Identify all defective materials

you claim you returned to plaintiff for which you claim you are
entitled to a credit.
ANSWER:

One hundred twenty five telephones, regular,

valued at $35.00 each, total value $4,375*00.
cordless, $199.00 each, total value $4,975.00.

Twenty five telephones,
Two Olivetti

typewriters, $500.00 each, total value $1,000.00.
$35.00 each, $700.00.

Twenty cameras,

Total goods and merchandise returned for

credit, $11,050.00.
125
25
2
20

t e l e p h o n e s , r e g u l a r @ 35.00
t e l e p h o n e s , c o r d l e s s @199.0Q
O l i v e t t i t y p e w r i t e r s Q500.00
cameras,
35.00

t o t a l goods and merchandise r e t u r n e d

ea.
ea.
ea.
ea.

$4,375.00
4,975.00
1,000.00
700.00

total
total
total
total

value
value
value
value

$11,050.00

DATED, t h i s t h e _ J
day of J u l y , 1991.
^^i^^tK^^H^iJ^^J^hKKV^inQ,
SERVICES, INC.

by

^crf?

. BLLJ^J>OSC\<A^, Vic/i

President
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STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

) ss,
)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah on this the ~< °°-x day of
July, 1991.

Notary Public
f
LYNN HEWARO
»
34 7*MuH*«W<iy
I
W»ftt V«.IWy Clry. Utah 04119!
Mv CommiMion
My
CommiufOn Exoiros
Expiros I
«Kin« 12,1934

-~t^i*~1-

u^/

NOTARY PUBLIC

I
MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that
within and foregoing Answers to
counsel Leslie Van Frank at 525
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

I mailed a correct copy of the
Interrogatories to plaintiff's
East First South.,*
Fifth Floor
J /
on this the
) — day of July, 1991c

/ » /
~F
n i m s a n s *d27
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COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
A Prvfen$ionai Corporation
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

525 EAST FIRST SOUTH
FIFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
Matting Addre»*

POST OFFICE BOX 11008
BRUCE G. COHNE
RICHARD A. RAPPAPORT
ROGER G. SEGAL
JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI
WILLIAM B. WRAY, JR.
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
JOIINT MORGAN
KEITH W. MEADE
RAY M. BECK
MICHAELS. EVANS
GALE K. FRANCIS
JULIE A. BRYAN
MARTHA S. STONEBROOK
CLAIRE G. ZANOLLI
LESUE VAN FRANK
M. JOY DOUGLAS

84147-0008

Telephone (801) 532-2666
_, .
. / o n n , . _ 1fl1Q
Telecopier (801) 355-1813
—

November 2o,

1989

OFCOUNSEL
JOHN B. MASON

National Insurance Marketing
5505 South 900 East, Suite 220
Holliday, Utah 84117
RE: Your account with

Chicago Barter Corp.

Gentlemen:
You have failed to respond to my previous letter dated
November 17, 1989, concerning your obligation to the above
captioned creditor.
This letter will serve as a reminder of that
prior letter, and also as a reminder of your unpaid obligation in
the amount of $10,873.37.
If I have not received your remittance in full nor heard
from you within five (5) days of the date hereof, you will leave
the creditor with no alternative but to commence suit for
collection of this sum, in which case interest, costs of Court
and any and all other applicable expenses, such as attorney' s
fees, will be included in the.amount, sued for, to your detriment.
The choice is yours. (
\

i'1'y' yours,

/4
Roger G. \Setokl
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
RGS: lc

LYNN P. HEWARD #14 79
DELWIN T. POND #2623
Attorneys for Defendant
923 East 5375 South #E
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Tel. 264-8040
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GRO ENTERPRISES, INC., dba CHICAGO

)

AFFIDAVIT OF

BARTER CORP.,

)

DELWIN T. POND

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)

NATIONAL INSURANCE MARKETING SERVICES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

)
) Civil No. 900906404CN
) Judqe J. Dennis Frederick

STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
County of Salt Lake )
Delwin T. Pond, being first duly sworn, deposes and says
that:
L

I am one of the attorneys for the defendant herein,

and I was the only attorney for the defendant during the time
period in which the events described herein took place.
2.

When I was first approached to serve as defendant's

attorney, I was informed by a principal of defendant, Robert
Weeks, that there were some interrogatories that needed to be
answered.

There was no desire expressed or evident on the part of

the defendant to postpone or avoid the answering of the
interrogatories.
3.

On that occasion, and as indicated in my affidavit

2
dated July 2, 1991 and filed herein, I spoke to Leslie Van Frank,
the attorney for the defendant, relative to settling the case on
the basis of the defendant paying all that would be left after the
credit that had been omitted.
4.

Ms. Van Frank indicated at that time that she did

not know about any possible credit.

She acceded to my request to

check on that and get back to me.
5.

It was my opinion, and I so informed Mr. Weeks, that

based upon the defendant's willingness to pay anything owed after
the appropriate credits were made, this case should be fairly
simple and should settle.
6.

There had been a Request for Production of Documents,

and I sent Ms. Van Frank a copy of a letter dated May 26, 1987
showing the items returned by defendant to plaintiff for a total
credit of $11,050, a copy of which letter is attached hereto.
7.

In view of this apparent likelihood of settlement,

it appeared that the immediate response to the interrogatories
would incur unnecessary costs.
8.
the same.

Ms. Van Frank gave no indication she did not feel

That is, she did not mention the need for immediate an

response except and until such was contained in her letter dated
June 3, 1991.
9.

I~ searching for information with which to draft the

Anwers to Interrogatories without the help of Mr. Weeks, who had
left the country without my knowledge, I contacted Mr. Bosqraff
and Mrs. Weeks and tried on numerous occasions to contact defendant's

former attorney, Mr. Turner.

However no one I spoke with had the

information I needed, and Mr. Turner never returned my calls.
10.

So I could not draft meaningful answers until I was

able to speak again with Mr. Weeks in Chile.

11.

Thus once it became clear that the Interrogatories

would need to be answered after all, I and the defendant did all
we could to expeditiously submit the Answers^
DATED this

/5~'

day of

*

Aw&tdttK',

1991.

Dtft-WIN T. POND
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
A^^^A_
, 1991.

/>

day of

NOTARY FUBLICT

Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah

My Commission Expires:

;• • v ;v lie
r..,.' hL\7 ..»D

i
1

v/oct v«s:c- c v u n h 0 4 i t * |
f 'j C rr.nrv
n Expires
Juno 1 - . 10-4
Slate cl U»ah

I
I
|

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing
Affidavit was mailed to Leslie Van Frank, P.O. Box 11008, Salt Lake
City, UT

84147 on this

postage attached thereon.

/ >^~"~ day of

/l/^-^-^-

r 1991, with

rsro

Natioi \u\ insurance
Marketing Services,
Incorporated
May 26, 1987
Chicago Barter Corp
8 00 E. Roosevelt Road
Lombard, Illinois 60148
Subject: Defective items
°lease credit our account for the following items that have
been returned to you, as they are either defective or outdated
125
25
2
20

Telephones, regular
Telephones, cordless
Typewriters, Olivetti
Cameras

$ 35, 00 ea
199, 00 ea
500, 00 ea
35. 00 ea
Total Credit

$ 4,375.00
4,975.00
1,000.00
700.00
$11,050.00

Robert Weeks

vq

/J

Sports Mall Plaza

5505 South 900 East,

Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

Phone: (801) 261-3888

